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Abstract. More often than not, bad decisions are bad regardless of where and when
they are made. Information sharing might thus be utilized to mitigate them. Here
we show that sharing the information about strategy choice between players residing
on two different networks reinforces the evolution of cooperation. In evolutionary
games the strategy reflects the action of each individual that warrants the highest
utility in a competitive setting. We therefore assume that identical strategies on the
two networks reinforce themselves by lessening their propensity to change. Besides
network reciprocity working in favour of cooperation on each individual network, we
observe the spontaneous emerge of correlated behaviour between the two networks,
which further deters defection. If information is shared not just between individuals
but also between groups, the positive effect is even stronger, and this despite the fact
that information sharing is implemented without any assumptions with regards to
content.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s
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1. Introduction
We create an enormous amount of information on a daily basis. According to Google’s
Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, every two days as much as we did from the beginning
of time up to 2003. It is the availability of this information that fuels data-driven research
efforts aimed at understanding the geographical patterns of mobility [1, 2] and scientific
production [3], the limits of predictability of sport performance [4] and market change
[5], the spread of infectious diseases [6, 7] and malware [8, 9], as well as the dynamics
of online popularity [10], social movements [11] and political campaigns [12], to name
but a few examples. Indeed, making information available contributes to discoveries
across the whole spectrum of social and natural sciences [13]. Withholding information
or failing to integrate it properly into the bigger picture, on the other hand, can have
many unwanted and unintended consequences [14].
Research in the realm of network science has recently highlighted that seemingly
irrelevant changes in one network can have catastrophic and very much unexpected
consequences in another network [15, 16]. The key to understanding these phenomena
is network interdependence [15, 17–20], and in particular knowing how information
available in one network might affect behaviour in another network. Figure 1 depicts
the red node on the upper network wanting to enforce its state (strategy) on the blue
node. Based on the information stemming from the bottom network, however, the blue
node might be more reluctant to the change than in the absence of that information.
This example can be made more concrete in the realm of evolutionary games on
networks [21–24], where the players compete for space by choosing to cooperate or defect
based on their success in maximizing their utility. The prisoner’s dilemma [25, 26], for
example, promises a defector the temptation T > 1 when facing a cooperator, while two
cooperators receive only the reward R = 1 each. Each individual is therefore tempted
to defect. Yet such antisocial behaviour can lead to the tragedy of the commons [27].
On a single network [28–39], various forms of reciprocity [40–43], most notably network
reciprocity [44], promote the evolution of cooperation. If the networks are more than
one and interdependent [45–49], new phenomena may emerge that additionally favour
prosocial behaviour. The enhanced resilience of cooperation can be due to a non-trivial
organization of cooperation across different network layers.
Unlike in previous works, we do not consider players in one network actually
affecting the utility of players in the other network. Instead, solely the information
about the strategies adopted in the other network is transmitted, and this affects the
propensity of players to change their strategy. While the probability to change strategy
is still determined by the difference in utility between the two neighbouring players in a
given network, e.g., the red and blue node in the upper network of Fig. 1, the information
about which strategies are adopted in the other network is used to scale this probability.
In particular, if the corresponding players in the other network adopt the same strategy
as the player targeted with a new strategy, as is the case in Fig. 1, the probability
to change strategy is decreased proportionally with the number of such players locally
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Figure 1. Information sharing between networks affects strategy transfer between
neighbouring players. The red player in the upper network tries to transfer its strategy
to the blue player. The blue player receives information from the corresponding players
in the bottom network that they all adopt the blue strategy. Because of this, the blue
player in the upper network is reluctant to change strategy to red, despite the fact
that the red player might have a higher utility.
present in the other network. Accordingly, even though the utility stemming from the
prisoner’s dilemma game of the red player in Fig. 1 may be much larger than that of the
neighbouring blue player, the probability to change strategy to red will be low because
all the corresponding players in the bottom network are adopting the blue strategy.
Many real life examples can be given to support such a procedure, not least insisting
on regulatory policies in one country based on the success of the same policies in
another country. Importantly, we make no assumptions with regards to the content
of the information that is transmitted. Defectors are just as free to transmit their
recommendation to the other network as cooperators. In this sense, the information
transfer is strategy neutral, and the information itself is neither filtered nor evaluated
based on perceived importance or potential impact. These are important assumptions
given that in general it is impossible to know in advance which information will be useful
and how it will affect the receiver. We only assume that the information about the
strategies is shared, and as we will show, this alone is sufficient for prosocial behaviour
to be promoted.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we
describe the model and the considered evolutionary games. Section 3 is devoted to the
presentation of results, whereas lastly, we summarize the main conclusions and discuss
their potential implications.
2. Model
The prisoner’s dilemma game on both networks is staged on a L×L square lattice with
periodic boundary conditions, where each player is connected with its k = 4 nearest
neighbors, as depicted in Fig. 1. Initially each player on site x in network A (up) and on
site x′ in network B (bottom) is designated either as a cooperator (C) or defector (D)
with equal probability. The accumulation of payoffs pix and pix′ on both networks follows
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the same procedure. Namely, each player plays the prisoner’s dilemma game with its
four nearest neighbours, whereby mutual cooperation yields the reward R = 1, mutual
defection and cooperation while the neighbour defects yields zero, and defecting while
the neighbour cooperates yields the temptation T > 1. The same parametrization has
been adopted several times before [44], and it is accepted that it captures all relevant
aspects of the prisoner’s dilemma game. More importantly, it also enables a relevant
comparison with the many preceding studies.
Following the determination of payoffs, which we here consider to be fully
representative for the utility, strategy imitation is possible only between nearest
neighbours on any given lattice, but never between players residing on different networks.
Accordingly, on network A player x can adopt the strategy sy of one of its randomly
chosen nearest neighbours y with a probability determined by the Fermi function [21]
W (sx ← sy) = wx
1
1 + exp[(pisx − pisy)/K]
. (1)
Here the scaling factor wx of player x depends on the strategies of related players from
the other network, and as such it is the key quantity that takes into account information
sharing.
The simplest option is to consider only the strategy of the directly corresponding
player x′ on the other network, and assume that wx is minimal if sx = sx′ and maximal
in the opposite case. To avoid frozen states we use wmin = 0.1 as the minimal scaling
factor, while the maximal is wmax = 1. We will refer to this model as model S, because
only a single player in the other network is taken as reference for determining wx. An
extension of the simplest model is if not only x′ but also its neighbors determine wx,
as schematically depicted in Fig. 1. In this case wx changes linearly between wmin and
wmax in accordance with
wx = 1− (wmax − wmin)
Nx
G
, (2)
where G = k + 1 is the size of the considered group in the other network and Nx is
the number of players in that group that adopt the same strategy as player x. We will
refer to this model as model G, because a whole group in the other network is taken as
reference for determining wx.
Since the prisoner’s dilemma game is governed by pairwise interactions, we test
the robustness of presented results by employing also the public goods game, which
is governed by group interactions. It is namely known that games governed by group
interactions can yield a qualitatively different outcome from games that are governed
by pairwise interactions [24]. The public goods game captures the essence of a social
dilemma in sizable groups. Within each group, cooperators contribute 1 to the public
good while defectors contribute nothing. All contributions are then summed up and
multiplied by the synergy factor r > 1, which takes into account the added value of a
cooperative group effort. This implies that if all players in the group choose the same
strategy, they are better off cooperating than defecting. Subsequently, the accumulated
goods are divided equally among all group members irrespective of their strategies to
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yield the payoff pigx on network A and pi
g
x′ on network B. Note that defectors bear no
costs when collecting identical benefits as cooperators. However, if nobody cooperates
the synergy factor has not effect and the public goods are lost, hence resulting in a
social dilemma. The public goods game is staged on a L×L square lattice with periodic
boundary conditions, where players are arranged into overlapping groups of size G = 5.
Every player is thus surrounded by its k = G − 1 nearest neighbors and is a member
in g = G different groups. As described, the payoff obtained in each group is pigx and
pigx′ , while the total amount each player x receives from all the five groups is given by
the sum pix =
∑
g pi
g
x on network A and pix′ =
∑
g pi
g
x′ on network B, which runs over all
the g = G different groups where x is member. All the other details of the model are
identical with those outlined for the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Simulations were performed by means of a random sequential update, where each
player on both networks had a chance to pass its strategy once on average during a
Monte Carlo (MC) step. The linear system size was varied from L = 800 to 6400 in
order to avoid finite size effects, and the equilibration required up to 106 MC steps.
Further simulation details are provided in the figure captions and the Results section.
3. Results
Throughout this section, we continuously compare the outcomes of the previously
described models denoted as I, S and G, which differ in to what extent information
is shared between players on the two networks. Accordingly, in model I information
is not shared, and the evolution on both networks proceeds completely independently.
In model S information is shared only between single players, while in model G the
shared information is collected from a whole group. Model G can be interpreted as an
“information cloud” from another network helping the player to adjust the propensity
to change strategy, as schematically depicted in Fig. 1. As Fig. 2 shows, the temptation
to defect at which cooperators die out increases steadily with the amount of information
that is shared. Model I recovers the traditional spatial prisoner’s dilemma game,
while models S and G strongly favour the odds of cooperators, also by increasing the
largest allowable temptation to defect at which cooperators die out completely. The
mixed phase region sustaining a stable state of cooperators and defectors shrinks, which
indicates that besides traditional network reciprocity additional, possibly more subtle,
mechanisms are at work.
To understand why cooperation is promoted in models S and G where information
is shared, we compare the time evolution of different quantities when starting from a
random initial state. To have an adequate comparison of the three different models,
we choose values of T that are close to the maximal values for which the system can
still reach the full C phase in the stationary state. The temptation is thus scaled so as
to be effectively equal in all three models. In panel (a) of Fig. 3, we can observe the
typical “first down, later up” trend of the fraction of cooperators, which is a trademark
of network reciprocity. However, while the dip of P (C) for model I is small, models S
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Figure 2. Information sharing promotes cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
The more information is shared, the higher the temptation to defect T at which
cooperators are able to survive. The critical T at which cooperators are able to
dominate completely increases as well, while the extent of the mixed C + D phase
shrinks. Depicted is the fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on T for models I,
S and G, as denoted in the figure.
and G exhibit a much stronger fall before cooperators are eventually able to recover.
Obviously thus, when information is shared the mechanism that will eventually promote
cooperation needs a while longer to start working effectively. And the delay is longer
in the G than in the S model. We argue that the delay is due to the fact that more
cooperators need to organize themselves when information is shared. Although utilities
are not affected by players from different networks, the interdependence introduced
by information sharing nevertheless imposes bonds that require coordination. Since in
model G more players are involved than in model S, it also takes more time. As the
green line in Fig. 3(a) shows, cooperators almost die out before ultimately rising to
dominance on both networks. This feature also involves that we must use a sufficiently
large system size to obtain reliable results for model G, especially in the vicinity of phase
transition points.
Since the fraction of cooperators fails to convey information about correlations
between the strategies, we present in panel (b) of Fig. 3 how the fraction of C − C
pairs within a network P (CCi) varies with time. For model I the curve virtually
does not decline before the rise, indicating that if C − C pairs are present, they can
immediately establish the necessary conditions to spread based on traditional network
reciprocity. For S and even more so for the G model, however, the sole vicinity of
cooperators within a network does not ensure the necessary conditions for spreading. In
fact, due to significantly higher temptation values, network reciprocity alone would be
unfit to prevent the extinction of cooperators. Accordingly, an additional mechanism
must emerge for the downward trend to reverse, and as expected, it comes from the
information shared between the two networks.
In order to reveal this, panel (c) of Fig. 3 shows how the fraction of C − C
pairs between the two networks P (CCe) changes during the evolution. However, it is
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Figure 3. Time evolution of cooperation and cooperative pairs within and between
networks reveals why information sharing promotes cooperation. Panel (a) shows the
fraction of cooperators P (C) in dependence on time, panel (b) shows the fraction of
C−C pairs within a network P (CCi), while panel (c) shows the fraction of C−C pairs
between the two networks P (CCe). Solid lines in panel (d) depict the excess correlation
of cooperators between the two networks, determined as P (CCe)− P (C)
2. For easier
reference, panel (d) also features P (C) as dotted lines. The values of T are 0.95, 1.08
and 1.16 for models I, S and G (as denoted on the figure), respectively. We have used
up to L = 800 system size and averaged the final outcome over 10 independent runs
to obtain accurate results.
conspicuous that for model S this curve shows a slight temporary maximum after only
two or threeMC steps. The early maximum is due to randomly established C−C pairs,
but their mutual support is fragile and cannot be maintained in the absence of local
clustering within a network. For model G this effect is less pronounced because it is very
unlikely that the whole group will be in the pure C state initially. The real correlation
between the two networks is shown in panel (d) of Fig. 3, where we compensate for
the fact that P (CCe) can be high even if there is no information transfer between the
two networks. To avoid this, we subtract P (C)2 from P (CCe), which then yields the
probability to find excess C − C pairs between the two networks. Expectedly, this
quantity is always zero in model I, as there the promotion of cooperation is due solely
to traditional network reciprocity. For the models S and G, however, the emergence
of excess C − C pairs between the two networks is crucial, as it enables the rise of
cooperators from their initial decline. To enable a direct comparison, we depict in panel
(c) also the fraction of cooperators as dotted lines. As we have already noted, there are
some correlations between cooperators at the very beginning of the evolutionary process,
especially in model S, but this additional effect that emerges due to information sharing
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Figure 4. Characteristic snapshots reveal the spontaneous emergence of correlated
evolution that is due to information sharing. Presented are snapshots of the upper
(a-d) and lower (e-h) network for model G as obtained for T = 1.08 after 50, 250,
700 and 1000 MCS from left to right. Defectors are denoted red and cooperators are
denoted blue. To visualize different values of the scaling factors wx that modify the
propensity of each player to change strategy, we use different shades of red and blue,
where darker colour marks smaller and brighter colour marks larger values of wx. The
random initial state and the final pure C phase are not shown.
can be really powerful only if it goes hand in hand with the clustering of cooperators
within a network. By comparing the curves with those presented in panel (b), we arrive
at the conclusion that only clustering and excess correlations due to information sharing
can overcome defectors at temptations to defect that exceed those that can be offset by
network reciprocity alone.
The emergence of correlations between the two networks can be visualized by
examining characteristic snapshots as they evolve on them, as presented in Fig. 4 for
model G. These snapshots clearly emphasize that the extra correlations between the
two networks, in association with the clustering within a network, warrant a powerful
support for cooperators to spread. Indeed, the correlation in model G is conspicuous,
as we can observe almost an identical evolution taking place on both networks, despite
the fact that only the information about strategies is shared solely in a way that affects
the propensity of players to change their strategy. Neither payoffs nor actual strategies
are transmitted between the two networks. For comparison, we have plotted the same
series of snapshots as obtained with model I for the same set of parameters. In this
case, as Fig. 5 shows, there is no correlation emerging between the two networks. Note
that here light blue domains reflect the absence of cooperators in the same place on the
other network, while light red signals the same for defectors. Darker shades of red in the
final stages are not due to correlation, but simply because defectors are very widespread
[this also further supports the subtraction of P (C)2 to quantify correlations between
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Figure 5. In the absence of information sharing evolution on the two networks
proceeds uncorrelated. Presented are snapshots of the upper (a-d) and lower (e-h)
network for model I as obtained for T = 1.08 after 2, 10, 100 and 300 MCS from left
to right. The applied colour scheme is the same as for Fig. 4. Although wx = 1 for all
players, we use the same shading to highlight the uncorrelated evolution. The random
initial state and the final pure D phase are not shown.
the two networks in Fig. 3(d)]. While cooperators do try to aggregate into compact
clusters on both isolated networks, the network reciprocity alone is unable to prevent
their extinction at such a high temptation to defect.
We have thus established that the correlated pattern formation, evoked by
the information sharing between the two networks, plays a fundamental role in
ensuring promotion of cooperation past the boundaries imposed by traditional network
reciprocity. However, given that information sharing is implemented without any
assumptions with regards to content, i.e., regardless of the strategy of the player or
the group of players that transmit the information, one could still be curious as to why
the procedure favours cooperators but not defectors. After all, given the correlated
evolutionary process on both networks, defectors could inform each other about the
success of their strategy too. Moreover, D−D pairs forming between the two networks
also protect each other by reducing their propensity to adopt the occasionally more
successful cooperative strategy. To clarify the biased consequence of strategy neutral
information sharing, we monitor the relative fraction of the so-called vulnerable players
in the G model. We designate as vulnerable every player who has wx = 1, because there
is no support coming from the other network in terms of reinforcing the player in the
strategy it currently holds. Accordingly, such players are most likely to change their
strategy, and are thus termed vulnerable. In Fig. 6, we present the fraction of vulnerable
cooperators VC and defectors VD over time, and contrast this with the overall fraction
of cooperators P (C). It can be observed that VC is really high, i.e., VC ≈ P (C),
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Figure 6. Vulnerable players that do not get affirmative information from the partner
network decide the fate of evolution. While cooperators advance very slowly, they also
do so compactly and coherently on both networks. They therefore reinforce their
strategies when sharing information between the networks. Defectors, on the other
hand, proceed fast and with disregard to what their partners on the other network are
doing. Ultimately this is their demise. Depicted is the fraction of vulnerable (those
having wx = wmax = 1) cooperators VC and defectors VD, as well as the overall fraction
of cooperators P (C), as obtained with model G for T = 1.08 at L = 3200 system size.
during the early stages of the game. This is because cooperators are unable to form
clusters at the beginning of the evolutionary process, which is a fundamental condition
to establish an efficient support between the two networks. At the same time, the
ratio for vulnerable defectors is extremely small because initially defectors spread very
successfully on both networks, making full use of the recommendation power that is
at their disposal due to information sharing. Yet shortly thereafter, the greediness of
the defectors starts taking its toll. More precisely, defectors on an isolated network
may proceed with their exploitation easily because of the high T value. However, the
“cloud” of cooperators supporting their spreading in the other network cannot follow
such an aggressive invasion, and hence defectors become vulnerable in the absence
of direct supporters in the other network. At the same time, cooperators employ a
more careful strategy, which makes them invade slowly but compactly. As snapshots in
Fig. 4 demonstrate, the borders of cooperative domains in both networks move almost
simultaneously, and hence cooperators never leave related players in the other network
“unprotected”. Note that along the interfaces in Fig. 4 there are more bright red players
than there are bright blue players. As the logarithmic vertical axis of Fig. 6 highlights,
the ratio of vulnerable defectors is very small when it changes tendency, yet still the rise
of VD is followed immediately by an overall increase of the cooperation level.
Since the prisoner’s dilemma game is governed by pairwise interactions, it is finally
of interest to clarify the role of information sharing also in games that are governed
by group interactions. In the Model section, we have introduced the public goods
game as a classical example of a game that is governed by group interactions. As
recently reviewed in [24], games governed by group interactions can yield very different
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Figure 7. Information sharing promotes cooperation also in games that are governed
by group interactions. The more information is shared, the lower the synergy factor
r at which cooperators are able to survive. The critical r at which cooperators are
able to dominate completely decreases as well. Compared to the effect reported for the
prisoner’s dilemma game in Fig. 2, however, for the public goods game the impact
of information sharing is weaker because group interactions do not allow as large
spatial fluctuations that would result in abundant vulnerable defectors. Depicted is
the fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on r for models I, S and G, as denoted
on the figure.
evolutionary outcomes on structured populations than games that are governed by
pairwise interactions. Notably, due to the participation in the same groups, even
players that are not physically connected by links act as if they were, which in turn
introduces qualitatively different limits in terms of the impact of uncertainty by strategy
adoptions [50], as well as in terms of spatial fluctuations which are effectively averaged
out [51]. As results presented in Fig. 7 demonstrate, information sharing does promote
the evolution of cooperation also in the public goods game. Yet the impact is rather
modest, especially when going from model S (information is shared only between single
players) to model G (shared information is collected from a whole group). This is a
direct consequence of multi-point interactions, which preclude large spatial fluctuations
and thus hinder the emergence of vulnerable defectors to the same extent as reported
above for the prisoner’s dilemma game. Vulnerable defectors do of course emerge, but
the interfaces are much more blurred due to group interactions, hence allowing defectors
to receive more support from the other network than they do by pairwise interactions.
Nevertheless, the excursion to games governed by group interactions does confirm that
sharing information is certainly not harmful, and thus can be fully recommended in
support of prosocial behaviour.
4. Discussion
We have introduced information sharing to evolutionary games. Players residing on
different, not physically connected networks, are allowed to exchange information in the
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form of strategies they are adopting, and this information regulates the propensity of
the receiver to change its strategy. We have shown that information sharing promotes
prosocial behaviour past the limits of traditional network reciprocity. The effect is due
to the synergy between network reciprocity and the spontaneous emergence of correlated
behaviour on the two networks. If information is shared only between single players,
the maximally allowable temptation to defect that still allows cooperators to survive
increases markedly. Further improving the odds of cooperation is if the information is
shared not just between single players but rather if it stems from groups. Importantly,
we have demonstrated that no additional assumptions are needed with regards to the
information that is shared for the newly identified mechanism to take effect. Defectors
are just as free to inform others about their strategy as cooperators. Ultimately, it is
the excessive greediness and disregard for the neighbours that dooms defectors. While
during the early stages of the game defectors may exploit the population more effectively
than in the absence of information sharing, the trend reverses sharply after both the
network reciprocity and the correlated behaviour between the two networks set in. The
way of cooperation is slow but steady, and as such it is designed so as to make optimal
long run use of information sharing.
Although information sharing is less effective for the promotion of cooperation in
games that are governed by group interactions, we have shown that it nevertheless
does help. This bodes well for the general applicability of information sharing as a
means to promote prosocial behaviour. However, one might wonder what happens if
the size of groups acting as information sources increases. Large groups effectively
act as mean-field territory, and as such they seem unable to advise relevantly on the
subject of strategy change. The information stemming from large conglomerates is often
diluted to a degree that it cannot serve a particular purpose. While crowdsourcing and
the so-called “wisdom of the crowd” effect [52] have recently received ample attention
[53–55], also in the realm of evolutionary games [56], in the context studied here they
cannot be advocated as viable choice. Sharing information locally is more akin to the
consideration of reputation [57–59], where players decide how to proceed based on their
experience from the past, and in doing so, they are able to deduce their expected payoff
in the future. Cooperators prefer colonization, and they do well in maintaining their
good reputation. Receiving information that a group is adopting cooperation is thus
inherently different from the information that a group is adopting defection. In the
latter case, although it may suggest that to defect is a good idea, it quickly turns out
that it is not, as the shadow of the past is quick to catch up in the absence of new
cooperators that one could exploit. It is thus reassuring to discover that the nature of
prosocial behaviour in social dilemmas is such that it naturally makes optimal use of
information stemming from other sources, if only it is made available.
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